Extrajudicial prisoners of the United States, in the context of the War on Terrorism, refers to foreign nationals the United States detains outside of the legal process required within United States legal jurisdiction. In this context, the U.S. government has been accused of maintaining covert interrogation centers, called black sites, operated by both known and secret intelligence agencies.[1][2] Of these prisoners some are suspected of being from the senior ranks of al Qaeda, referred to in U.S. military terms as "high value detainees." According to Swiss senator Dick Marty's reports on "Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states", about a hundred persons had been kidnapped by the CIA on European territory and subsequently rendered to countries where they may have been tortured.[1][2] While former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has described those detained in Camp Delta at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as "the worst of the worst," it is now known those with the highest intelligence value are not detained or interrogated in Cuba, and are thought to be held at "black site" facilities in Eastern Europe.
Ghost detainees are extrajudicial prisoners whose identity hasn't been revealed and whose families don't know their locations. They are thus deprived of any Habeas Corpus rights. Ghost detainees' identities, or indeed capture, have been kept secret. As such they are a subset of extrajudicial prisoners, which also includes all the detainees who were held in Guantanamo, etc.
On September 6, 2006, American President George W. Bush confirmed, for the first time, that the CIA had held "high-value detainees" in secret interrogation centers. He also announced that fourteen senior captives were being transferred from CIA custody, to military custody, at Guantanamo Bay and that these fourteen captives could now expect to face charges before Guantanamo military commissions. Critics, and elements of the FBI, had long speculated that the captives held in the secret interrogation centres had been subjected to abusive interrogation techniques, and thus any evidence derived from their interrogations could not be used to prosecute them. Transfer of these fourteen men had emptied the CIA's secret interrogation centers. Critics pointed out that Bush had not announced that the CIA's secret interrogation centers were being closed.
JTF-GTMO ISN |
name | notes |
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10011 | Mustafa al-Hawsawi |
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10012 | Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani |
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10013 | Ramzi bin al-Shibh |
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10014 | Waleed Muhammad bin Attash |
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10015 | Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri |
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10016 | Abu Zubayda |
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10017 | Abu Faraj al-Libi |
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10018 | Ali Abdul Aziz Ali |
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10019 | Hambali |
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10020 | Majid Khan |
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10021 | Mohamad Farik Amin |
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10022 | Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep |
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10023 | Gouled Hassan Dourad |
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10024 | Khalid Sheikh Mohammed |
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American intelligence officials have made public the names of some of the suspects the CIA has reported to have been held. The capture of other detainees is not acknowledged. According to the US military this is in order to spread disorder among their opponents. It also has the effect of keeping critics of the extrajudicial detention in the dark as to the circumstances of detention and conditions in the prisons (see ghost detainee).
name | notes |
Jamil al-Banna |
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Muhammed al-Darbi | |
Omar al-Faruq |
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Abd al-Salam Ali al-Hila |
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Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi | |
Adil al-Jazeeri | |
Yassir al-Jazeeri | |
Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi |
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Bisher al-Rawi |
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Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi |
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Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman |
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Musaad Aruchi | |
Hassin Bin Attash |
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Abdul Aziz | |
Abu Faisal | |
Hassan Ghul |
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Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan |
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Tariq Mahmood | |
Binyam Mohammed |
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Shortly after the Invasion of Afghanistan the Bush administration announced a policy that combatants captured "on the battlefield" in Afghanistan would not be afforded the protections of POW status as described in the Geneva Conventions. This policy triggered debate both within and outside of the US government. The Bush administration argument in favor of this policy was that the Geneva Conventions the USA signed protected the fighters of only recognized states, and al Qaeda fighters didn't qualify. Further, they argued, the Taliban wasn't a real government either. They characterized Afghanistan as a "failed state," one without a legitimate government.
The Bush administration calls these captives "illegal combatants" or "unlawful combatants." These terms are not explicitly used in the Geneva Conventions. The third Geneva Convention, however, signed prior to World War II, does define "lawful combatant." The Convention obliges signatories to afford captured lawful combatants significant rights and protections. Such captives are entitled to be classified as Prisoners of War (POW). Internal critics within the US military and US government argue that failing to afford POW protections to combatants captured in the global war on terror would endanger American soldiers, when they were captured, in current and future conflicts. Other critics argue that classifying all combatants as illegal combatants is in violation of article 5 of the third Geneva Convention, which describes how a captor should treat combatants who are suspected of violating the Geneva Conventions such that they strip themselves of its protections. Article 5 says that combatants suspected of violations of the Conventions are to be afforded POW protection until the captors have convened a "competent tribunal."
The Bush administration has expanded the criteria for classifying captives as illegal combatants. Individuals captured around the world are now classified as such if US intelligence officials believe they have sufficient evidence to tie the individual to terrorism.
There are circumstances when the legislative and judicial branches can overrule the executive branch. In Rasul v. Bush, the US Supreme Court ruled that detainees in the global war on terror did have the right to mount legal challenges within the US judicial system.
There have been vigorous debates within the US intelligence community over what techniques should be used on the detainees.[10] The debate was triggered over the interrogation of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, described as the first senior al Qaeda captive. It was reported that initially his interrogation was being conducted by the FBI because they had the most experience interrogating criminal suspects. Their interrogation approach was based on building rapport with suspects and they did not use coercive techniques. They argued that coercive techniques produced unreliable false confessions and that using coercive techniques would mean that the evidence they gathered could not be used by the prosecution in a trial in the US judicial system.[10]
However, impatience for actionable intelligence led to the handover of responsibility for interrogation to the CIA, who were authorized to use "enhanced interrogation techniques". In reaction to the release of the abuse pictures from Abu Ghraib, the CIA suspended the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques."[12]
Secretary Rumsfeld assured the world that the detainees held in Guantánamo Bay were going to be treated in a manner consistent with the treatment of Geneva Convention POWs. In 2004, confidential memos surfaced that discussed the limits to how much pain, discomfort and fear could be used in the interrogation of detainees in the global war on terror. The memos showed that there was active debate within the Bush administration.
Some human rights critics believe that the existence of those memos is tacit acknowledgment that American intelligence officials had already been engaging in coercive interrogation techniques.
US Senator John McCain, a former POW from the War in Vietnam, attached a passage to a military spending bill that would proscribe inhumane treatment of detainees and restrict US officials to only use the interrogation techniques in the US Army's field manual on interrogation. Ninety of the one hundred Senators supported this amendment.
On Thursday, October 20, 2005, Vice President Dick Cheney proposed a change to McCain. Cheney tried to get McCain to limit the proscription to just military personnel, thus allowing CIA personnel the freedom to use more brutal techniques. McCain declined to accept Cheney's suggestion.[13]
The United States government, through the State Department, makes periodic reports to the United Nations Committee Against Torture. In October 2005, the report focused on pretrial detention of suspects in the War on Terrorism, including those held in Guantánamo Bay and Afghanistan. This particular Periodic Report is significant as the first official response of the U.S. government to allegations that prisoners are mistreated in Guantánamo Bay. The report denies the allegations. However, the report does not address detainees held elsewhere by the CIA. Recently, the Director of the CIA, Michael Hayden has acknowledged that some detainees have been subject to waterboarding as per several OLC (Office of Legal Council) memos. General Hayden states that currently (as of 2/7/08) waterboarding is not part of the authorized interrogation techniques for U.S. agents.
The CIA's Inspector General began looking into a number of cases where innocent men were captured and transported through "erroneous renditions." There was said to be 3,000 individuals who found themselves in CIA custody.[14]
On July 20, 2007, President Bush issued an executive order banning torture of POWs by intelligence officials.[15] Amnesty International points out that the Bush administration has a very limited definition of torture. Relevant to understanding this order, note that whilst the US is a signatory, it has failed to ratify that portion of the Geneva Convention, Protocol I, which would grant these persons POW status.[15] The US is one of only six countries that have not.
Location | Details |
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USS Bataan | John Walker Lindh was held, for two months, in a secure facility aboard the USS Bataan. Human rights critics believe he was merely one of half a dozen high value detainees held there. |
The Salt Pit |
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